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| | SUMMARY |
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| | USSR |
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| | British Ambassador considers Soviet Union anxious for cease-fire (page 3). |
| | FAR EAST |
| | 2. Chinese Communist support of Viet Minh depreciated (page 3). 3. Pope grants audience to De Lattre on Vietnamese problems (page 4). |
| | NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST |
| | Current international situation alarms Afghanistan (page 4). |
| | 5. Terrorist campaign predicted against British nationals in Arab states (page 5). |
| | 3. British and American Ambassadors warn of serious developments in Egypt (page 6). |
| 7 | Cypriot Communists reportedly planning coup (page 6). |
| | NORTH AFRICA |
| | Spain seeks rapprochement with Moroccan Nationalists (page 7) |
| | WESTERN EUROPE |
| g | Benelux countries may oppose European Defense Forces plan (page 8). |
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| | USSR |
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| | the previously adamant stand on the 38th Parallel may be a reflection of |
| | Soviet anxiety for a cease-fire. There are, however, no indications |
| | that the Communist negotiators will further discuss their new offer, which is "unacceptable" to the UN representatives. |
| | to the Civilepicsentatives. |
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| | FAR EAST |
| 2. | Chinese Communist support of Viet Minh depreciated: |
| | |
| | US Leg Saigon 26 Oct 51 no Chinese were identified |
| . | SECRET among Viet Minh personnel killed or taken |
| Sto | He also confirmed a sharp decrease in the activities of Viet Minh training |
| | schools in China and said that those trainees still remaining were re- |
| | ceiving their military education through service in Chinese units. |
| | In considering the question of Chinese Commu- |
| | ist intervention in Indochina, both the Chinese and the Viet Minh were anxious 'not to make Vietnam a |
| | second Korea. " materiel aid by the Chinese would con |
| | tinue but "other support" would decrease. |
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| | Comment: No member of the Chinese Communist armed forces has ever been identified as serving with the Viet Minh. This fact together with the above report, supports a recent estimate that only "a few" Chinese Communist advisers and technicians are present in Tonkin, thus discounting another estimate of 10,000 to 15,000. |
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| 3. <u>F</u> | Pope grants audience to De Lattre on Vietnamese problems: |
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| . +h | e French puppet government of Vietne |
| ta an so an | e French puppet government of Vietnam, Bao Dai was received with eserve when he visited Rome, presumably because of strong representions to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are exious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of the million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals ad represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would dicate. |
| ta an so an | tions to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are axious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of the million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would |
| ta an so an | tions to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are exious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of ome million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would dicate. |
| ta an so an ind | tions to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are exious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of ome million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would dicate. NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST |
| ta an so an ind | tions to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are exious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of ome million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would dicate. NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST The French are exious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of the many intellectuals are represented to the area than numbers would dicate. |
| ta an so an ind | tions to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are exious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of ome million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would dicate. NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST Trent international situation alarms Afghanistan: The Afghan Government, genuinely alarmed at the recent turn of events in the Near East and |
| ta an so an ine | NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST Trent international situation alarms Afghanistan: Emb Kabul Oct 51 ONFIDENTIAL NEAR AND MIDDLE TAST The Afghan Government, genuinely alarmed at the recent turn of events in the Near East and South Asia, has assured the US of its coopera- |
| ta an so an ine | tions to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are exious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of ome million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would dicate. NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST Trent international situation alarms Afghanistan: The Afghan Government, genuinely alarmed at the recent turn of events in the Near East and |
| ta an so an ine | NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST Trent international situation alarms Afghanistan: Emb Kabul Oct 51 ONFIDENTIAL NEAR AND MIDDLE TAST The Afghan Government, genuinely alarmed at the recent turn of events in the Near East and South Asia, has assured the US of its coopera- |

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| tion "in every possible way" and has withdrawal of its proposal to bring A settle their current disputes. | requested the US to reconsider the fghanistan and Pakistan together to |
| Commen made on 6 November 1950, has achie and the US has recently informed Afg drawal. | t: The American proposal, first eved no concrete result to date, thanistan and Pakistan of its with- |
| As a con events in the Near East, the Afghan C of its international position. It is posant change in Afghan policy is in the conciliatory attitude toward Pakistan in world affairs. | ssible, therefore, that an import- |
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| legedly to Mufti of J of his Ara | zerrorist attacks" upon British will begin within ten days in Syria, ebanon, and Jordan, The campaign, al- be directed by the former Grand erusalem, will combine the efforts b Higher Executive with those of m Brotherhood. |
| extremist members of the Egyptia Moslem Brotherhood should be "given violence and terrorism" while the gove it was doing its best to control the org | a free hand and encouraged in |
| continuation of disturbances in Egypt of the other Arab countries would probable Moslem Brotherhood. This group is whas semi-legal status, and also in Syringer | ly lie with the hypernationalistic |
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| | The Moslem Brothers, supported by the Mufti's henchmen and the Communists, have already evidenced a readiness to exploit the current Arab tension despite the restrictions which the Arab governments themselves are likely to impose against terrorist activities. |
| 6. | British and American Ambassadors warn of serious developments in Egypt: |
| L | US Emb Cairo The US Ambassador in Cairo reports that his British colleagueadvised London on 25 October that the new British Government would Soon have to make "very grave decisions" in regard to Egypt. If the present situation in the Suez Canal zone is allowed to drift, he said, a revolution in Egypt is in prospect, ending with British reoccupation of the country. Without a minimum of Egyptian cooperation, it is "probable that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain British troops at Suez." If, on the other hand, British military authorities exercise their power to shut off oil, "disaster will probably ensue." |
| | The American Ambassador comments that the United States must also "think this whole business out and not get involved in a dead-end loaded with dynamite." |
| 7. | Cypriot Communists reportedly planning coup: |
| | US Emb Athens The Cypriot Communists have procured 1,500 26 Oct 51 rifles and are preparing for an early coup according to the Greek Prime Minister. |
| | an effort by Greek Nationalists to promote Greek-Cypriot union, or enosis, by exploiting US concern over recent events in the Near East. The Nationalists believe that the US, if sufficiently alarmed over the security of Cyprus, might be presuaded to exert pressure upon Britain in favor of enosis. |
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The Communists, aware of the current possibilities for weakening the British hold on this strategic island, may be planning an incident to focus world attention on Cypriot demands. However, the British security forces in the area are believed capable of coping with any Communist-inspired disturbances.

NORTH AFRICA

8. Spain seeks rapprochement with Moroccan Nationalists:

US Leg Tangier 24 Oct 51 SECRET

General Franco allegedly has approved a scheme for including Spanish Moroccan Nationalists in the administration of the Cite - Januar 15) Spanish protectorate of Morocco. The Spanish High commissioner plans to talk with the leader of the Spanish

Moroccan Nationalist party, a man who has long been considered a fugitive from Spanish justice.

The US Legation in Tangier comments that the High Commissioner apparently is moving rapidly toward a rapprochement with the Nationalists despite the opposition of his advisors, who caution that the Nationalists would use Spanish Morocco as a base for anti-French activity.

Comment: Spain has long resented the preponderant French influence in Morocco, and desires to strengthen Spanish prestige with the Arabstates.

By apparently relaxing their severe repression of nationalism, by promising participation in government now, and by hinting that Spain favors Moroccan independence, Spanish officials hope to discredit France with the Arab League and improve Spain's relations. Spain has no intention, however, of relinquishing its hold on Morocco.

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WESTERN EUROPE


9. Benelux countries may oppose European Defense Forces plan:

US Emb The Hague A Socialist member of the Dutch Parliament 26 Oct 51 states confidentially that the Benelux meeting SECRET at Brussels on 25 October was convened "to Ltte - The Hogue 409 organize a united front against the European Defense Forces The Dutch Foreign Office strongly opposes the European Defense Forces plan, and the Cabinet is divided on the issue, with the Socialists and Catholics supporting the plan.

The meeting of Benelux ministers Comment: ostensibly was intended to examine the various questions which might be raised in connection with a common European defense organization. None of the Benelux countries has indicated any enthusiasm for the plan, and the Dutch Foreign Minister is known to be personally opposed. However, after much Cabinet and high level discussion, the Dutch recently sent an official delegate to the European Defense Forces conference in Paris.

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| | SUMMARY | |
| | FAR EAST | |
| pag 2. Mili | nmunist tactics to gain control of Korean air situation forecast ge 3). Itary government for Malaya recommended (page 3). Volution' in Thailand predicted (page 4). | N. |
| | NEAR EAST | |
| 4. Bri 5. Iran | tish now seen ready to settle Iranian oil crisis (page 5). ian Communists hope to secure representation in Parliament (pa | age 5). |
| | WESTERN EUROPE | |
| 6. Italy 7. Fren (page | chooses new Ambassador to Great Britain (page 6). ach adamant on own terms for US North African commitment e 6). | |
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Comment: Such a policy would presumably mean abandoning the program of gradual development of self-government in Malaya which the British Government has followed despite the great obstacles posed by the "emergency."

The murder of High Commissioner Gurney on 6 October and a particularly bloody ambush of British-led security forces during the past week will lend weight to the insistence of military officials who have recommended "taking the gloves off." It is possible that the Conservative government in London will reinforce British troops in Malaya, but not at the expense of the principle that the battle for Malaya is primarily political in character.

| | 'Revolution' in Thailand predicted: | 25 |
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| | A Chinese Nationalist predicts | 25 |
| | that a bloodless "revolution" will probably take | |
| | place in Thailand on 31 October. | 25 |
| | Premier Phibun and General Sarit, | 25 |
| 1 | Assistant Commander in Chief of the Thai Army, are planning to remove | |
| | General Phao, Director General of Police, and General Phin, Commander in | |
| 1 | Chief of the Army. The plotters are timing their action to take advantage of Phao's current absence from the country. | |
| | nao s current absence from the country. | |
| | Comment: A reorganization of the government | |
| 8 | long lines suggested by this report has some plausibility. General Sarit is | |
| | known to be antagonistic toward the Phin-Phao clique, and Phibun has been | |
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| | ng representatives of opposition political parties a move which has been | |
| i | ng representatives of opposition political parties a move which has been consistently opposed by Phin and Phao. In addition, the ambitious Phao | |
| i | consistently opposed by Phin and Phao. In addition, the ambitious Phao | |
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| | • | NEAR EAST |
| 4. | British now seen re | eady to settle Iranian oil crisis: |
| Si | agree to any reasor completely non-Bri | The US Embassy in London assumes that the Conservatives will be anxious to start off their term in office by settling the Iranian oil question. It believes that the Britishare now willing to nable settlement, possibly including the acceptance of a itish organization to operate the oil industry. |
| | fused to commit the | Comment: Although the British have to date reemselves to the replacement of British management of ey have gradually come to realize that this is inevitable. |
| | • | |
| 5. | Iranian Communists | s hope to secure representation in Parliament: |
| | | The illegal Tudeh Party reportedly intends to present at least thirty "disguised" candidates in the approaching Parliamentary elections in order to obtain the 12 or 15 seats necessary for the effective obstruction of Parliament. |
| | | Comment: Tudeh interest in securing repre- |
| | sentation in Parlian | nent has been reported previously, Tudeh has identified itself with nationalism in the present |
| 1 | oil issue, its candid of the National Fron | dates may well be elected together with bona fide adherents |
| | Police to arrest thin | Increasing Tudeh strength and a reported inst the Shah have stimulated the new Iranian Chief of rty Tudeh members and to plan a further program of ng the arrest of all Tudeh members now in key government |
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| | WESTERN EUROPE | |
| 6. | Italy chooses new Ambassador to Great Britain: | |
| | Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador in Moscow, has been chosen to be the new Ambassador to Great Britain. Brosio is said to have displayed unusual acumen in evaluating Soviet policies. US Emb Moscow 27 Oct 51 RESTRICTED Comment: In view of Mr. Churchill's suggestion that a Truman-Churchill-Stalin conference be held, the Italian Government may consider it particularly useful to have a man of Brosio's background and abilities in London. | 5) |
| 7. | Enough adament as any town a few TIC N. II Ac. | |
| | French adamant on own terms for US North African commitment: French Foreign Minister Schuman, in rejecting a US revision of a proposed exchange of notes between the United States and France on North Africa, emphasized that a satisfactory text could not depart from a second French redraft which he thereupon presented to Ambassador Bruce. | 25 |
| | The French Government insists that a satisfactory exchange of notes must be concluded before it will permit a military survey of Tunisia or grant military facilities in North Africa. | |
| | Comment: The French Government is insisting on written assurances that the US will not interfere in internal North African affairs. In the meantime, a United States military survey mission in the Mediterranean has been refused a Tunisian clearance. | |
| | Growing discord between the Arab world and the West is increasing French anxiety to obtain US approval of French policy in North Africa. If such approval is not given, France can be expected to attempt to curtail all outside influence in its North African holdings. | |
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